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Strategic autonomy and EU-NATO Cooperation: 
squaring the circle 
Jolyon Howorth 
Since the publication of the European 
Union Global Strategy (EUGS) in June 
2016, there have been innumerable calls for 
the re-launch of the EU’s much 
misunderstood Common Security and 
Defence Policy (CSDP). One can call this 
CSDP-redux. What is the objective behind 
this renewed energy? 
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again, with a major paradox. The EU aspires 
to strategic autonomy, the US concurs with 
that ambition, yet in practice the EU finds 
itself once again dependent on NATO for its 
collective defence and even for its collective 
security. 
   
Since the EU‘s December 2013 European 
Council meeting on CSDP, there has been 
quasi-unanimity within the security community 
that greater cooperation and complementarity 
between CSDP and NATO is urgent and 
indispensable. But what precisely is being 
called for? The documents themselves are 
extremely vague in this respect. The EUGS 
refers to NATO on no fewer than ten 
occasions. On three of these, it speaks simply 
of ―deepening the transatlantic bond and our 
partnership with NATO‖ (twice), and of 
―working closely with [our] partners, 
beginning with NATO‖. Specific cooperative 
projects include cyber threats, security sector 
reform, capacity building, strengthening 
resilience among neighbourhood states, global 
governance, maritime security, parallel and 
synchronized exercises and hybrid warfare. 
This is really a laundry-list of issues on which 
cooperation ought to be taken for granted 
rather than needing to be proclaimed. The 
same laundry-list of cooperative projects is to 
be found in the EU-NATO Joint Declaration of 
8 July 2016.1  How can this insistence on 
cooperation and complementarity be 
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The keyword in the EUGS is ―strategic 
autonomy‖, an aspiration regularly repeated in 
that document. Yet the foundational logic 
behind CSDP was, from the outset, 
―autonomy.‖ At the Franco-British summit in 
Saint-Malo in December 1998 (the birthplace 
of CSDP), it was believed that only via a 
European agency would the member states 
develop genuine military capacity and generate 
a strategic approach to regional security 
challenges. This would have the additional 
benefit of allowing the US to focus its 
activities on more urgent regions of the planet. 
But, after fifteen years of efforts, CSDP failed 
to deliver on autonomy. NATO had to be 
called upon for leadership during the 2011 
Libya crisis, and the emerging security threat 
from Russia brought NATO firmly back to 
Europe. At the same time, the US message 
became ever more intense: US allies should 
take primary security responsibility for their 
neighbourhood. We are therefore faced, once 
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reconciled with the aspiration towards 
―strategic autonomy‖?  
 
The ―official‖ explanation plays on 
institutional niceties. This is what the EUGS 
says: 
―When it comes to collective 
defence, NATO remains the primary 
framework for most Member States. 
At the same time, EU-NATO 
relations shall not prejudice the 
security and defence policy of those 
Members which are not in NATO. 
The EU will therefore deepen 
cooperation with the North Atlantic 
Alliance in complementarity, synergy, 
and full respect for the institutional 
framework, inclusiveness and 
decision-making autonomy of the 
two.‖ 
 
In other words, being different entities, with 
somewhat different members, and having 
different objectives, the two must live with 
and respect that difference. This is a largely 
legalistic argument (the two are indeed 
different legal entities), but one with clearly 
substantial political connotations (their policies 
and activities in the security and defence realm 
overlap to a considerable extent). This political 
dimension is rendered all the more acute in 
that clear and undisputed leadership in NATO 
lies with the United States – which is a 
completely different actor from either the EU 
or NATO.  
 
This is where the discussion becomes 
interesting.  In most of the major statements I 
referred to, there are sentences to the effect 
that while NATO remains the primary actor in 
European collective defence, the EU should 
be able both to contribute more substantially to 
that objective, and to undertake robust 
missions in which the US has no interest. The 
apparent implication here is that the EU (via 
CSDP) aims to become a military actor 
comparable to NATO – while not undermining 
it or questioning its supremacy. But what 
 exactly does that mean? What is it that the EU 
wishes to bring to the collective defence table 
that would give it the ability to act without 
NATO if necessary, but that would not 
question the need for or the preponderance of 
NATO? If the EU actually achieves strategic 
autonomy, what is NATO for? And 
conversely, if the EU does not achieve 
strategic autonomy, what is CSDP for?  
 
VIEWS FROM THE US  
Here‘s where the US debate comes in. For our 
purposes, the key issue has become President 
Trump‘s cavalier suggestions that the US is fed 
up with paying for European free-riders and is 
rethinking the very bases of the Alliance. His 
favourite taunt is that NATO is ―obsolete‖.  
But let‘s not forget that Eisenhower said in 
1949, ―If NATO is still needed in ten years, it 
will have failed in its mission‖. However, 
Trump‘s (apparent) position on NATO is not 
as outlandish as some commentators have 
suggested. He was not alone in expressing 
exasperation with NATO. Bernie Sanders 
expressed a very similar message, as did Rand 
Paul. These ideas also have a very strong 
pedigree among US international relations 
experts. MIT professor Barry Posen, in a path-
breaking book, Restraint, called for a gradual, 
ten-year, American withdrawal from NATO, 
accompanied by the progressive transfer of all 
its functions to Europeans.2 Allies, he insisted, 
are costing more than they are worth. Posen‘s 
conclusion: NATO can be transferred to the 
Europeans and, if they don‘t want it, ―it can be 
allowed to lapse‖.  
His proposals are echoed by another high-
profile US public intellectual, Boston 
University‘s Andrew Bacevich:  
―Should it choose to do so, Europe—even 
after the British vote to leave the EU—is fully 
capable of defending its eastern flank. The next 
administration should nudge Europeans 
toward making that choice […].‖  
He proposes that the next SACEUR should be 
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a European officer. Then a firm date for 
ending US membership in NATO and 
withdrawing the last US troops from Europe. 
The next administration‘s message to Europe, 
he argues, ―should be clear from day one: 
‗ready your defenses; we‘re going home.‖3  
 
The same message came in summer 2016 from 
two of the most high-profile neo-realists in the 
US academy, Stephen Walt and John 
Mearsheimer: 
 
―In Europe, the United States should end its 
military presence and turn NATO over to the 
Europeans. There is no good reason to keep 
US forces in Europe, as no country there has 
the capability to dominate that region.‖4 
 
Far from being outlandish, such sentiments are 
becoming mainstream in the US. 
 
So the key question really is the level of EU 
ambition. If we take seriously the four major 
objectives set by the EUGS, we are clearly 
talking about the highest possible level of 
ambition: 1) protection of the ―European way 
of life‖; 2) maintaining security in both the 
Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods; 3) 
helping keep open the commercial sea-lanes 
between Suez and Shanghai; 4) assisting and 
complementing UN peacekeeping. This 
ambitious reading of the EUGS poses a huge 
question about the ultimate state of EU-
NATO relations. That question becomes all 
the more acute in that there are parallel calls 
for NATO to boost its capacity, in view of 
Russian aggression in the East, chaos to the 
South, and with an insurgent in the White 
House. Karl-Heinz Kamp, in a recent seminal 
paper, argues that NATO‘s most recent 2010 
strategic concept is already out of date. NATO 
must massively ―adapt its strategic 
foundations‖.5 But if both NATO and the EU 
were significantly to enhance their existing 
capabilities, would this not inevitably call for a 
radical rethink of the connection between 
them?   
FOUR SCENARIOS  
I perceive four scenarios for the EU-NATO 
relationship over the next decade or so.  The 
first, which cannot entirely be ruled out, would 
see the gradual unravelling of European 
integration in general, given the EU‘s inability 
to solve its three ―crises of sovereignty‖: 
money, borders, and defence. This scenario has 
been rendered even more plausible by Brexit, 
by Trump and by the spread of populist forces 
hell-bent on breaking up the Union. For lack 
of leadership, the EU will fail in its efforts to 
coordinate defence policy and will simply fall 
back on the US as in the past – in effect, a 
return to the 1950s. This would be the worst of 
all possible scenarios, both for the EU itself 
and for the US.  
A second scenario, would be the status quo, in 
which CSDP would continue along the same 
old track, with modest improvements in both 
EU capacity-generation and decision-making. 
This would constitute an admission of failure 
to meet even the minimal expectations written 
into the EUGS. It would not even approach 
strategic autonomy, it would not allow the EU 
to achieve any significant progress in 
improving the resilience of the neighbouring 
states, and it would not meet any of the 
expectations articulated by a range of voices 
across the US. From the EU-NATO 
perspective, CSDP, far from increasing 
cooperation with NATO, would remain a 
passenger.  
A third scenario would be one in which 
significant, but still limited, progress were made 
via CSDP-Redux.  The instruments that are 
being widely discussed – the European 
semester, R&T in military procurement, the 
OHQ, battle-groups and especially (most 
analysts‘ favourite) Permanent Structured 
Cooperation (PESCO), if cumulative, could 
well produce a far more effective CSDP, 
capable of making a difference particularly in 
the Southern neighbourhood. This would not 
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quite amount to ―strategic autonomy‖. It would 
not allow the EU alone to offer a containment 
and deterrence posture against Russia, or indeed 
against an eventual nuclear-armed, ballistic-
missile-carried threat from Iran (or any other 
state in the Middle East). It would represent a 
serious step beyond the status quo, but would 
still leave the EU as a subordinate security entity 
to NATO, while at the same time expending a 
great deal of money duplicating capabilities 
largely provided to NATO by the US. In my 
view, this is the most likely scenario, but it 
would ultimately prove frustrating for both sides 
of the Atlantic. If the EU can get this far, why 
not go the whole way? 
 
The final scenario, which I favour but which I 
suspect is unlikely to happen, would take the 
dynamics and energy of the post-Brexit CSDP-
Redux, situate them in the historical context of 
the post-Cold War world, the post-9/11 world, 
and indeed the post-Trump world, and lead 
them to their logical conclusion. There is no 
God-given law whereby Europe should be reliant 
in perpetuity on an ally for its regional security. 
Powerful forces in both parts of the North 
Atlantic space have been unleashed since the 
end of the Cold War calling upon the EU to 
become an autonomous and mature actor in 
international affairs. It is far from clear that the 
US will remain willing – or indeed able – 
financially, politically or even militarily – to play 
the role of global or regional policeman that it 
assumed in 1945. The world is undergoing a 
process of power transition and the greatest 
challenges to the US in the remainder of the 21st 
century will come from the Asia-Pacific region. 
Europe is confronted with a set of challenges in 
its Southern and Eastern neighbourhoods that 
the EUGS outlines with great clarity. Ultimately, 
it has to solve those challenges itself. The US 
cannot ―solve‖ Europe‘s ―Russia problem‖. 
Only the EU can do that. But it can only do it 
with genuine strategic autonomy. 
 
This means ending its dependency on the US; it 
means becoming a security actor that is at least 
comparable to NATO. Many US voices have 
called on the EU to step up to the plate and 
assume leadership in its neighbourhood. The EU 
should take up that American challenge and 
progressively assume leadership in meeting its 
own regional challenges. The US can be a key 
enabler of that apprenticeship in leadership. It 
can continue to back-stop EU security policy 
with critical enablers such as intelligence, 
logistics, heavy lift, command and control – but 
only as a temporary measure while Europe 
acquires the experience and the confidence to 
meet future challenges on its own. Such a 
development would be massively in the US‘s 
best interests: to have a competent, mature and 
self-reliant partner with which to face the global 
challenges of the 21st century. When the EU 
reaches that stage, the need for a US-dominated 
NATO will fade. The best way of reaching that 
stage is progressively to merge CSDP into 
NATO, to take over, step by step, command of 
the major agencies in NATO, and to allow the 
US to focus on the areas of the world that are of 
the most strategic importance to Washington. At 
that point, the Europeanised-NATO, 
incorporating CSDP-Redux, can sign a bilateral, 
co-equal and different type of alliance with the 
US. That is the ultimate logic of the EUGS.  
Anything else would be simply to repeat the 
story of the past 15 years. It would be déjà vu all 
over again. It would be a half-measure that 
would ultimately satisfy nobody. 
Prof. Dr. Jolyon Howorth, Yale University, 
wrote this paper while a Senior Fellow at 
the Kolleg-Forschergruppe (KFG) "The 
Transformative Power of Europe” at the 
Free University of Berlin.  
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